








Aid and Oil in Papua New Guinea: 




This  paper  measures  the  extent  to  which  both  donor  finance  and  resource 
revenues have contributed to higher rates of expenditure in key development 
sectors of the PNG economy—social services (including health and education) 
and  infrastructure,  between  1975  and  2010.    Estimated  elasticities  are  then 
compared  against  a  hypothetical  revenue  scenario  to  assess  the  potential 
contribution that post-2014 LNG revenue inflows may have on increasing the 
financing available to these sectors.    
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Aid and Oil in Papua New Guinea: Implications for the Financing of Service 
Delivery 
1. Introduction 
Papua New Guinea (PNG) has relied heavily on both foreign aid (henceforth ‘aid’) 
and the extraction of minerals (henceforth ‘resources’) as sources of government 
revenue  during  its  post-independence  era.  The  first  section  of  this  paper 
analyses  how  both  these  revenue  sources  have  influenced  government 
expenditure  patterns  during  the  post-independence  period.  This  includes  a 
comparison of the impact of budget support vis-a-vis project aid on financing 
core service delivery activities, as well as how aid has compared against resource 
revenues  in  financing  the  same.  Estimated  elasticities  are  then  used  to 
extrapolate what impact the commencement of an upcoming Liquefied Natural 
Gas (LNG) project may have on the expenditure composition of government and 
the financing available to these core service delivery priorities.  
As shown in Chart 1, PNG’s dependency on aid revenues has varied considerably 
over time. Between 1975 and the mid-1990s the portion of government revenue 
obtained through aid flows followed a long term decline - falling from a high of 
60 per cent of total government revenue to 10 per cent. This occurred largely as 
a  result  of  the  scaling  back  of  Australian  general  budgetary  support  and 
expanding domestic revenue sources. As Australia then expanded its programme 
of direct project support and a number of new donors entered the country, aid 
increased back to approximately 20 per cent of total government revenue for the 
latter half of the 1990s. With relatively constant nominal aid flows and a scaling 
up of alternative domestic source of government this proportion then fell back 
down to 10-15 per cent during the mid to late 2000s.  
Resource  revenues  have  also  been  volatile.  In  the  early  post-independence 
period the majority of revenues were obtained from new mining operations in 
Bougainville, which were contributing up to 10 per cent of total government 
revenue (Wolfers 1981). The early 1980s saw a period of reduced output from 
the Bougainville mine, leading to dramatic decrease in resource revenues in the 2 
 
early-1980s.  Resource  revenues  again  increased  in  the  mid-1980s  as  output 
picked  up  in  Bougainville  and  a  number  of  smaller  mining operations  began 
production – reaching 12 per cent of total government revenues by 1988. PNG’s 
burgeoning resource sector then recorded another large setback in 1989 when a 
struggle  for  greater  compensation  and  less  environmental  damage  by  local 
residents led to a closure of the mine in Bougainville. At half way through a 30-
year lifespan, this single mining operation was generating approximately 15 per 
cent  of  government  revenue  –  as  well  as  35  per  cent  of  the  country’s  total 
exports and 8 per cent of GDP (Stein 1991, p. 7).  
With the commencement  of a number of new mining operations in the early 
1990s1 resource revenues again increased, fluctuating between 10 per cent and 
20 per cent of total government revenues until 2002. From 2002, PNG began to 
benefit from its largest ever resource revenue boo m with global prices for its 
major mining exports – principally gold and copper – reaching record highs. By 
2007  resource  revenues  were  contributing  almost  40  per  cent  of  total 
government revenue. With a moderation in global resource price levels and a 
scaling back of production at a number of mining operations this contribution 
moderated from 2008 onwards, reaching 35 per cent of total revenues in 2010.  
Over the coming years, PNG’s reliance on resource revenues is again expected to 
increase. This is attributable largely to the commencement of a large LNG gas 
project which is expected to begin making direct payments to government from 
2014. Projections indicate that these revenues could be as high as K2bn for the 
first ten years of production (2014-2024) and K3bn thereafter – representing a 
22 per cent and 33 per cent increase to total revenue and grants in the 2011 
Budget,  respectively  (ACIL  Tasman  2009;  PNG  Budget  2011).  In  contrast  to 
increasing  resource  revenues,  nominal  aid  flows  are  expected  to  remain 
                                                 
1  PNG’s  largest  mining  projects  since  independence  have  included  Exxon  Mobil  LNG  (2014 
onwards, Southern and Western), Ok Tedi gold and copper (1984-present, Western), Panguna 
gold  and  copper  (1975-1989,  Bougainville),  Porgera  gold  (1989-present,  Enga)  ,  Lihir  gold 
(1997-present, New Ireland), Hidden Valley gold and silver (2009-present, Morobe), Ramu nickel 
and cobalt (2010-present, Madang), Misima gold and silver (1990-2004), Hidden Valley gold and 
silver (2009-present, Morobe). Other smaller gold and copper mining operations and current 
surveying  include  Simberi  (New  Ireland),  Solwara  (New  Ireland),  Tolukuma  (Central),  Wafi-
Golpu (Morobe), Woodlark (Milne), Yandera (Madang), Kainantu (Central), Imwauna (Milne), Mt 
Bini (Central), Mt Kare (Enga).  3 
 
relatively constant over the medium term with the 2011 Budget projecting total 
aid to decline marginally from 1.5bn in 2011 to K1.4bn in 2015 (PNG Budget 
2011).  This  amount  will  maintain  aid  at  approximately  14  per  cent  of  total 
government  revenue  between  2011  and  2014.  However,  assuming  aid  flows 
remain  constant  and  alternative  domestic  revenue  sources  increase  as  LNG 
payments begin; this will result in a significant decline in the proportion of total 
government revenue attributable to aid from 2014 onwards – most likely to less 
than 10 per cent of total revenue.  
Chart 1: Resource and Grant Revenues as a Proportion of Total Revenue 
and Net Lending 
 
Source: PNG Budget Documents (Various years); Batten (2010).  
2. Literature Review  
A heavy reliance on resource revenues can have many adverse impacts on the 
fiscal behaviour of a government. By obtaining revenue from a small number of 
mining operations rather than the population at large, resource revenues can 
weaken the economic and social management responsibilities of a government. A 
lack of accountability to domestic constituents can also weaken budgetary and 
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public  investment  such  as  low  levels  of  financing  for  development  oriented 
activities (Moss et al 2006, p. 10). The large, often opaque, revenues associated 
with  mining  operations  can  also  promote  intense  rent-seeking  amongst  the 
political elite as they vie to expand access and control of these revenue inflows. 
This promotes further distortions in fiscal priorities. Resource revenues can also 
undermine  government’s  incentive  to  establish  a  well-functioning  tax 
bureaucracy as it finds it more politically appealing to rely on extracting than to 
increase  taxes  on  domestic  constituents.  This  creates  a  resource  dependency 
further amplifying each of the above effects.  
Many of these same arguments have also been leveled against aid as a source of 
government  revenue.  Aid  can  distort  fiscal  priorities  by  reducing  the 
accountability of Government’s to its citizens and eroding domestic institutions 
(Knack 2000). The unpredictable nature of aid revenues can contribute to the 
same  damaging  boom-bust  expenditure  cycles  encouraged  by  a  reliance  on 
resource revenues. The potential for continuous financial bail-outs from donor 
organisations has also been associated with the moral hazard of encouraging less 
responsible  debt  management  and  lower  levels  of  public  savings  (Franco-
Rodreiguez et al 1998). Some authors have even found that the unaccountable 
and unpredictable revenue associated with aid has posed a larger burden on the 
quality  of  recipient  countries  institutions  than  those  revenues  obtained  from 
resource extraction (Djankov, Motalvo & Reynal-Querol 2005).    
The criticisms of both resource and aid revenues have been particularly strong in 
the case of PNG. Curtin (2001) argues that the volatility in resource revenues to 
PNG has contributed to damaging boom-and-bust cycles in government spending 
which  has  undermined  the  quality  of  long  term  expenditure  planning.  Faal 
(2007, p. 20) also concludes that resource revenues in PNG have encouraged 
undisciplined government expenditures, which has led to a large focus on non-
productive activities. Further, Windybank and Manning (2003, p. 12) argue that 
aid  has  enabled  successive  PNG  governments  to  ‘live  beyond  their  means, 
encouraging irresponsible policies and postponing the need for reform’. Indeed, 
according to Windybank and Manning (2003), aid has not only perpetuated poor 
policies but also encouraged PNG’s dependence on financial assistance as the 5 
 
expansive aid program became a surrogate government. This argument was also 
supported by Hughes (2003) and Hughes and Windybank (2005) who argue that 
aid has supported irresponsible fiscal behaviour. 
More recently Batten (2010) estimated that as a result of being used for debt 
repayment and domestic revenue substitution, aid flows have had a weak effect 
on  increasing expenditure levels in social service delivery sectors. Feeny and 
McGillivray (2009) also found that donor funds had been predominately used to 
finance unanticipated shortfalls in the recurrent budget rather than increasing 
levels of fixed capital investment.  
To estimate the impact of both aid and resource revenues on the expenditure 
composition of the PNG government this paper draws on, and extends, the aid 
fungibility  framework  originally  developed  by  Pack  and  Pack  (1990).2  This 
framework has been used in numerous country level studies to estimate the 
impact of aid on   government choices for co mbinations of expenditure across 
sectors, subject to the budget constraints established by domestic revenues and 
the inflow of foreign aid (Pack & Pack 1990; Pack &  Pack 1993; Tiwara 2007; 
Peterson 2007). Estimates then show how aid resources intended for one sector 
have influenced government expenditure both in that sector,  and whether it has 
freed up resources to be transferred to other sectors.  
This paper extends the aid fungibility framework to also take account of the 
impact of both budget support an d resource revenues on the same system of 
                                                 
2 An alternative approach used by authors such as Khilji and Zampelli 1991, Feyzioglu et al. 1998 
and Swaroop et al. 2000 uses panel data to measure the impact of aid on expenditure patterns 
across  a  large  sample  of  countries.  A  criticism  of  this  approach  however  is  that  because 
individual recipient bureaucracies are likely to respond in vastly different ways to aid inflows, 
estimation results will aggregate the important heterogenous impacts of aid. Another criticism 
relates  to  the  utility  specification  which  these  studies  adopt  for  government  preferences 
distinguishing between two types of expenditure—those to which aid is allocated and others 
which receive no aid. Authors such as McGillivray and Morrissey (2000a, p. 421) argue that this 
assumption is acceptable only if there is reason to believe that these two types of expenditure 
can be separated within the government’s utility function such that aid funds can only affect 
government consumption decisions through the fungible portion whilst non fungible aid has no 
impact. As Feyzioglu et al. (1998, p. 34) highlight, this requires that ‘aid affects the government’s 
choice [over all public goods] only through the fungible portion; public goods purchased from the 
non-fungible  part  do  not  affect  this  choice’.  Given  the  inter  related  nature  of  all  these 
expenditures, however, there is no reason for this to  be the case. In fact, one of the central 
features of categorical fungibility highlights that if aid funding of one sector increases, then the 
fungible portion of that aid allows government to increase all other expenditures.  
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interdependent  fiscal  equations.  General  budget  support,  whilst  also  being  a 
component of aid, differs from project aid in the sense that it simply augments 
Government’s  consolidated  revenue  –  in  contrast  to  project  aid  which  is 
allocated to a specific sector. Likewise, resource revenues are also treated as a 
simple augmentation of government’s consolidated revenue – rather than as an 
allocation to a specific sector. Making this distinction between aid modalities is 
particularly important when analysing the fiscal effects of aid in PNG, as it has 
received approximately 57 per cent of its aid resources in the form of general 
budgetary  support  since  independence.  Further,  almost  50  per  cent  of  its 
remaining  domestically  generated  revenues  have  been  generated  directly 
through resource extraction industries.  
The following section develops a model that incorporates budget support as well 
as  resource  revenues  into  the  typical  project  aid  fungibility  framework.  This 
framework is then used to analyse how project aid, budget support and resource 
revenues  (henceforth  collectively  known  as  windfall  revenues)  have  each 
impacted on the PNG Government’s expenditure behaviour since independence. 
3. Model 
The general approach taken by indifference curve fungibility studies has been to 
select a number of sectors, i, for which fungibility is a concern (typically pro poor 
expenditure  sectors  such  as  health  and  education).  All  the  non  ith  sector 
expenditures are then placed into a ‘general’ expenditure category. Likewise, aid 
flows are classified on a sector basis such that all non ith sector aid flows are also 
included in a ‘general’ aid category. A system of simultaneous equations are then 
estimated such that:  
                                                                       (1) 
                                                                      (2) 
                                                                             (3) 
 Where       is government expenditure on development sector i at time t.       
is project aid allocations made to development sector i at time t.        is the 7 
 
residual  project  aid  allocations  made  to  all  development  sectors  other  than 
sector i at time t.     is general government expenditure made to all other non 
development sectors at time t.       is aid allocations not made to the general 
category at time t.    is total project aid allocations to all sectors which is equal 
to ∑                , where     are general budget support grants at time t and 
      is domestically generated revenue.  
A limitation with this approach however, is that project aid intended for the non-
ith sector is treated equally by the government in its decisions over inter sectoral 
transfers as general budget support. The problem with this assumption is that 
project aid intended for the non-ith sector has still been allocated to a specific 
sector, whereas general budgetary support simply augments domestic revenue 
collection.  
This means that budgetary support  will be allocated entirely on  the basis of 
government  preferences  whilst  the  portion  of  the  non-ith  sector  project  aid 
which  is  transferred  will  depend  upon  the  degree  to  which  the  recipient 
government perceives it to be fungible. Given this, the inclusion of budgetary 
support in the residual project aid variable is likely to lead to an over estimate of 
the amount of fungibility taking place from these residual project aid allocations. 
For a country such as PNG which has received 57 per cent of its total foreign 
assistance in the form of budgetary support this issue is likely to be of particular 
importance. This paper thus estimates a model which both allows for divergent 
impacts between each of these types of aid delivery.   
An additional question posited by this paper is how resource revenues impact on 
expenditure  patterns,  as  such  the  below  model  also  isolates  the  resource 
revenue component of domestic revenue collection. These resource revenues are 
treated in the same fashion as general budget support - an exogenous revenue 
inflows, independent of prior economic performance and free by the recipient 
government to be spent on any expenditure category.  
The basic model to be estimated thus builds on Peterson (2007) and Pack and 
Pack (1990; 1993), but with the disaggregation of foreign grants into project aid 8 
 
and budgetary support and with the isolation of resource revenues from other 
domestic revenues. These additions also create a number of differences in the 
fungibility calculations which are discussed in the text.  
The calculations focus on three categorical expenditure items—social services, 
which  includes  health  and  education  expenditure,  infrastructure  and  all 
remaining general expenditures. The basic model to be estimated thus consists 
of a system of interdependent fiscal relationships of the form:  
                                                   (4) 
                                                  (5) 
                                                          (6) 
Where     is general budget support at time t, and        is resource revenue 
inflows  from  extractive  industries  and         is  all  other  non-windfall 
domestically  generated  revenues.    All  variables  are  measured  in  per  capita 
natural logarithms in constant 1990 prices. This leads to the estimation of the 
following system of equations3: 
                                                                                           
(7) 
 
                                                                                                         
(8) 
                                                                                               
(9) 
                                                 
3 The Bougainville crisis was a traumatic episode for the political, economic and fiscal 
management of PNG. Initial estimations sought to control for this event and to determine 
whether it has had any structural effect on the expenditure and revenue management of the PNG 
economy, by including a dummy variable into the estimations. This variable took the value of 
zero for 1974–88 and one for 1989–2010 however did not have any significant impact on the 
results so has been excluded in the final estimations. An organised reconciliation process began 
at the tribal level in the early 2000. 9 
 
 
                                                                                                     
(10) 
In each period the government must satisfy an inter-temporal budget constraint 
equal to:  
                                                                                     
(11a) 
Which upon aggregation of the project aid, expenditure and revenue variables 
simplifies to:   
 ∑                   ∑                          ∑                                                                      
(11b) 
Where     is debt servicing costs and      is the government’s budget deficit or 
surplus.  As  is  standard  in  the  literature,  debt  servicing  is  assumed  to  be 
exogenous  and  in  this  case  included  in  the  general  government  expenditure 
category, both to preserve degrees of freedom and to keep the model tractable.  
Equation (11b) implies that the identities shown in Equations (7–10) are jointly 
determined and hence not independent of one another. This situation violates 
the  OLS  assumption  of  zero  error  term  correlation  and  will lead  to  any OLS 
coefficient estimates being both biased and inconsistent. To deal with this issue, 
a systems estimation procedure known as SUR is utilised. SUR is a version of 
multivariate  linear  regression  developed  by  Zellner  (1962)  which  solves  the 
minimal error variance for the estimated parameters through the simultaneous 
estimation  of  the  system  of  equations.4  This  procedure  corrects  for  the 
correlation across the error terms in each equation, improving the efficiency of 
                                                 
4 Seemingly unrelated regression estimates are obtained by first estimating a set of non-linear 
equations with cross-equation constraints imposed, but with a diagonal covariance matrix of the 
disturbances across equations. These parameter estimates are used to form a consistent estimate 
of the covariance matrix of the disturbances, which is then used as a weighting matrix when the 
model is re estimated to obtain new values of the parameters. These estimates are consistent and 
asymptotically normal and, under some conditions, asymptotically more efficient than the single 
equation estimates. 10 
 
the  coefficient  estimates  (Wooldridge  2002,  p.  144).  5  For  the  purposes  of 
estimation, the budget deficit or net borrowing is taken as the excluded variable 
from the system of jointly determined equations to prevent the estimation of an 
identity in Equations (7–10). 
For each of the expenditure Equations (7–9), a positive elasticity coefficient on 
the respective aid allocation variable (                     ) would indicate that 
an increase in aid funding results in increased categorical expenditures for each 
respective sector. On the other hand, a positive elasticity estimate on the other 
aid allocation  variable (                     ) indicates a transfer of resources 
from  other  aid  funded  activities  to  that  expenditure  category.  Likewise,  a 
positive  elasticity  estimate  on  either  the  budgetary  support  coefficient 
(                     )  or  the  extractive  resource  revenue  coefficient 
(                     ) indicates that an increase in these sources of government 
revenue leads to an increase in expenditure for that development expenditure 
category.6  From these coefficients it is then possible to calculate:7  
  The marginal impact of an increase in project aid allocated to each of the 
social services, infrastructure and general expenditure categories. As well 
as the impact of this project aid on expenditure levels in other sectors of 
the economy.  
  The  marginal  impact  of  an  increase  in  general  budget  support  on  the 
funding  levels  for  the  social  services,  infrastructure  and  general 
expenditure categories. 
  The marginal impact of an increase in extractive resource revenues on the 
funding  levels  for  the  social  services,  infrastructure  and  general 
expenditure categories. 
                                                 
5 Notably, estimating a system of equations simultaneously only improves the efficiency of the 
coefficient  estimates  if  there  is  some  connection  between  each  of  the  equations  of  interest 
(Kennedy 2003, p. 314). 
6 It should be noted that from a theoretical perspective it is also required that the sum of the 
budgetary support coefficients across all the expenditures not exceed 1.  
7 This approach builds on Pack and Pack (1990:192) and simulates the effect of a percentage 
increase in total foreign aid per capita (project aid and budgetary support) on each of the 
expenditure categories.   11 
 
  The marginal impact of an increase in total windfall revenues (project aid, 
budget support and extractive revenues), allocated at historical averages, 
on the funding levels for the social services, infrastructure and general 
expenditure categories. 
The first step in this process is to calculate the change in each of the expenditure 
categories, as well as non-windfall-revenues, which result from a simultaneous 
change in each of the categories of foreign aid. The initial categorical level of 
windfall revenue is equal to          ̅̅̅̅̅̅
   ̅̅̅̅̅ ⁄  , where    ̅̅̅̅̅ is total windfall revenue and 
    ̅̅̅̅̅̅ is the average level of windfall revenue given to category i across the period. 
For Equation (7) the elasticity effect with respect to social services project aid is 
equal to: 
      
      =   ̂
      
where  given  that  ESS  and  ASS  are  measured  in  natural  logarithms,   ̂
      
represents an elasticity coefficient. This elasticity of education expenditures with 
respect to social services project aid can thus be written as:   
  ̂
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    ̂       
    
    
 
Multiplying this term by the proportion of an overall windfall revenue per capita 
increase  which  is  allocated  to  the  social  services  sector  based  on  historical 
averages gives:  
     
     
    ̂       
    
    
 
   ̅̅̅̅̅  
   ̅̅̅̅̅  
where    ̅̅̅̅̅ is total windfall revenues and    ̅̅̅̅̅   is the average amount of total 
project aid given to the social services sector. This can then be rewritten as: 12 
 
   ̂             ̂
       
    
    
        
where     ̂         is  the  total  change  in  social  services  expenditure  from  a 
prorated change in project aid allocated to the social services sector. Completing 
the same process for the infrastructure and general project aid variables as well 
as the general budgetary support and extractive revenue variables then gives the 
total  effect  of  a  marginal  increase  in  windfall  revenue  on  social  services 
expenditures. This can be written as: 
   ̂            ̂
       
    
    
            ̂
       
    
     
             ̂
       
    
   
      
    ̂       
    
     
                                                                                                       (12)                                      
where     ̂          is  the  total  change  in  social  services  expenditures  from  an 
increase in windfall revenues of all types—project aid given to social services, 
other  project  aid,  budgetary  support  and  extractive  industries  revenues—
allocated at historical averages. Equally, the total effect of an increase in windfall 
revenues for the other expenditure and revenue items considered in Equations 
(7–10) can be written as: 
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The total effect of an increase in windfall revenues can then be compared against 
the marginal impact of an increase in extractive resource revenues on each of 
these expenditure categories, to determine whether aid, or resource revenues 
have had a larger impact on financing development expenditures in PNG. For the 
social services equation (7) this effect can be written as:  
       
      
          such that if             ̂    
It can be said that an additional dollar of resource revenue has, in the past and 
according  to  historical  averages,  had  a  larger  marginal  impact  on  increasing 
social  services  spending  than  an  additional  dollar  in  aid  revenue,  also  when 
allocated  at  historical  averages  between  project  aid  categories  and  general 
budget support. This model thus has a number of important features which are 
useful in the analysis of the fiscal effects of windfall revenues in the PNG context. 
Firstly,  it  distinguishes  between  ‘other  project  aid’  and  ‘general  budgetary 
support  aid’,  reducing  the  potential  for  an  upward  bias  in  the  fungibility 
estimates.  Secondly,  it  disaggregates  between  extractive  resource  and  non-
extractive domestic revenue collection, allowing a comparison of how aid and 
windfall  resource  revenues  have  influenced  the  expenditure  priorities  of 
successive PNG Governments. Thirdly, it allows aid to all expenditure categories 
to  influence  the  consumption  choices  of  government  in  all,  even  non  aid-
receiving, sectors of the economy. Fourthly, it distinguishes between government 
expenditure  and  aid  revenue  according  to  their  function  rather  than  the 
recurrent and development classifications used in much of the literature. This 
distinction gives a more relevant assessment of the contribution of fiscal policy 
settings  to  key  service  delivery  sectors  such  as  health,  education  and 
infrastructure.  
4. Data Collection  
GDP,  expenditure  and  revenue  data  is  obtained  from  official  PNG  budget 
documents as described in Appendix 1. This paper uses the same methodology 
as established in Batten (2010) for the allocation of government expenditure by 
sector,  with  IMF  (2010)  being  used  for  pre-2002  expenditure  data  and 14 
 
government  budget  documents  being  used  for  post  2002.  In  addition  to 
aggregate  revenue  and  expenditure  the  estimations  also  require  a  detailed 
matching  of  aid  allocations  with  sectoral  expenditures.  The  IMF  (2010)  and 
OECD DAC (2010) databases are not directly comparable and require an element 
of discretion on the author’s behalf as to which expenditure is allocated to which 
sector. A full description of this can be found in Appendix 1. 
As is typical within the literature, the OECD DAC (2010) database was used to 
obtain sectoral aid flows. Optimally, this aid data would record disbursements by 
sector  however  only  has  a  sufficiently  complete  time  series  of  categorical 
expenditures on a donor commitment basis—with aid disbursement data only 
available at an aggregate level. To overcome this, Petterson’s (2007) method is 
followed—sectoral commitment data is used to calculate the share of project aid 
going to each sector as well as the share being given as budgetary support each 
year. These proportions are then applied to the total project aid disbursements 
from PNG Budget Documents to give aid allocations by sector.  Whilst there is 
little a priori evidence to suggest that certain types of aid would be disbursed 
more than others following donor commitments, a fundamental assumption of 
this  paper  is  that  aid  disbursements  by  sector  are  allocated  in  the  same 
proportion  to  which  donor  commitments  are  made.  A  full  description  of  the 
alignment of sectoral aid flows to sectoral expenditure can be found in Appendix 
2.  This data is measured in US$ and converted into Kina with period average 
exchange rates. 
The general budgetary support variable measures commodity aid and general 
unallocated  program  assistance  and  is  taken  directly  from  PNG  Budget 
Documents. All nominal data are deflated into 1990 constant prices with the 
consumer price index and measured in per capita natural logarithms. A summary 




Table 1: Summary Statistics  
  Label  Mean  Sum  Min  Max  Range  SD 
Real GDP   GDP  935.44  33,675.79  631.17  1,155.43  524.25  136.98 
Expenditure  and  Net 
Lending  
E  294.68  10,608.33  174.78  438.79  264.01  53.23 
Infrastructure 
Expenditure  E_I  23.39  841.90  0.00  58.82  58.82  12.96 
Social  Services 
Expenditure  E_SS  66.43  2,391.37  24.01  95.54  71.53  21.42 
General Expenditure  E_G  204.86  7,375.06  33.10  296.31  263.21  42.17 
Total  Revenue  and 
Grants  Rev  271.66  9,779.89  146.21  346.32  200.10  36.83 
Resource Revenues   Rev_X  37.53  1,351.01  1.46  117.10  115.63  29.26 
Grant Revenues   -  67.12  2,416.39  25.26  161.06  135.80  35.56 
Budget Support   BS  49.55  1,783.63  0.00  161.06  161.06  49.03 
Project Support   A  17.58  632.76  0.00  61.25  61.25  20.69 
Infrastructure Grants  A_I  3.97  143.01  0.00  27.55  27.55  6.07 
Social Services Grants  A_SS  4.51  162.46  0.00  24.97  24.97  6.19 
General Grants  A_G  9.09  327.29  0.00  37.13  37.13  11.09 
Other  Infrastructure 
Grants 
A_I_O  13.60  489.75  0.00  49.55  49.55  16.20 
Other  Social  Services 
Grants  A_SS_O  13.06  470.30  0.00  43.98  43.98  15.61 
Other General Grants  A_G_O  8.49  305.47  0.00  36.66  36.66  10.98 
Bougainville Dummy  DUM  0.28  10.00  0.00  1.00  1.00  0.45 
5. Estimation 
The SUR estimation procedure accounts for the interdependent nature of these 
fiscal relationships, which allows the estimation procedure to correct for any 
simultaneity bias which may have occurred within a non-simultaneous equation 
framework. 
The relationship between each of these equations is that the error terms in each 




Table 2: Impact of Windfall Revenues on Expenditure Categories  
 
(1)  (2)  (4)  (5) 
     
    
 
     
    
 
  EXP_SS  EXP_I  EXP_G  REV_NW  Full  2006-
2010 
A_SS  0.064        0.04  0.07 
  (0.063)           
A_SS_O  0.047        0.13  0.27 
  (0.061)           
A_I    0.188      0.04  0.07 
    (0.103)         
A_I_O    -0.151      0.13  0.26 
    (0.111)         
A_G      0.081    0.09  0.20 
      (0.085)       
A_G_O      0.002    0.08  0.14 
      (0.074)       
A        0.048  0.17  0.34 
        (0.047)     
BS  0.258  0.265  0.102  0.014  0.47  0.00 
  (0.039)**  (0.089)**  (0.076)  (0.048)     
REV_X  0.014  0.075  0.150  -0.101  0.36  0.66 
  (0.037)  (0.081)  (0.072)*  (0.044)*     
Bougainville 
Dummy  0.002  -0.469  0.004  0.163     
  (0.061)  (0.146)**  (0.126)  (0.080)*     
Constant  3.205  2.066  4.374  5.252     
  (0.253)**  (0.560)**  (0.488)**  (0.304)**     
Observations  36  36  36  36     
Standard errors in parentheses; * significant at 10% level; ** significant at 5% 
level; *** significant at 1% level. ψ lnOAi  measures total project aid allocations less 
aid allocations from the dependent variable category (i). Note: For the purposes of 
estimation,  the  origin  is  re-based  to  +1  by  adding  one  to  each  observation.  A 
number of variables in a number of years have observations which are close or 
equal to zero. Taking the natural logarithm of these values would thus lead to 
them turning negative and also result in the low values of aid and expenditure 
allocations  becoming  more  dispersed  whilst  the  higher  values  become  more 
compressed. In the estimation, this would give undue weight to the lower valued 
aid and expenditure observations which is likely to cause a bias in the results. 
Adding one to each of the observations also has the added advantage of allowing 
the inclusion of the zero valued aid and expenditure observations and allowing all 
values to remain strictly positive (Van de Sijpe 2007:36). 
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Full sample  2006-2010 
Average 
Social Services               (2a+2b)  (2a+2b) 
a) A_SS  0.04  0.07  0.064  14.72  0.038  0.066  0.069  0.130 
b) A_SS_Oss  0.13  0.27  0.047  5.08  0.031  0.064  (2a+2b+2c)  (2a+2b+2c) 
c) BS  0.47  0.00  0.258  1.34  0.162  0.000  0.231  0.130 




               0.240  0.147 
Infrastructure              (2a+2b)  (2a+2b) 
a) A_I  0.04  0.07  0.188  6.14  0.046  0.081  0.011  0.011 
b) A_I_OI  0.13  0.26  -
0.151  1.79  -0.035  -0.070  (2a+2b+2c)  (2a+2b+2c) 
c) BS  0.47  0.00  0.265  0.49  0.061  0.000  0.072  0.011 




               0.090  0.043 
General              (2a+2b)  (2a+2b) 
a) A_G  0.09  0.2  0.081  22.42  0.163  0.363  0.167  0.370 
b) A_G_OG  0.08  0.14  0.002  24.03  0.004  0.007  (2a+2b+2c)  (2a+2b+2c) 
c) BS  0.47  0.00  0.102  4.11  0.197  0.000  0.364  0.370 








            (2a+2b)  (2a+2b) 
a) A  0.17  0.34  0.048  9.52  0.078  0.155  0.100  0.155 
b) BS  0.47  0.00  0.014  3.38  0.022  0.000  (2a+2b+2c)  (2a+2b+2c) 
c) Resource  0.36  0.66  -
0.101  4.49  -0.163  -0.299  -0.063  -0.144 
* Indicates that the total calculated change in expenditure level is significantly different from the prorated change 
in expenditure levels at a 5 per cent significance level.  
 
 
                                                 
8  Such  that  for  the  education  equation  the  following  calculations  are  made  for  rows  1-3 
respectively: 1) e_e/a_e  2) e_e/a_e_o  3) e_e/bs, 4) e_e/extractive rev. 18 
 
6. Estimation Results  
The results indicate that windfall revenue has had an important influence on 
overall expenditure and revenue patterns in post-independence PNG. For each 
additional Kina of windfall revenue, spending in social services has increased by 
24  toea,  infrastructure  spending  has  increased  by  9  toea,  and  general 
expenditure has increased by 66 toea.  
This overall impact does however mask substantial differences in how each of 
the three types of windfall revenues (resource, budget support and project aid) 
have  impacted  on  each  of  these  spending  priorities.  Firstly,  budget  support 
appears  to  have  supported  more  productive  expenditure  patterns  than  an 
equivalent inflow of resource revenues. As shown in Table 3, for a given one Kina 
increase in windfall revenues 0.47 toea has on average been received in the form 
of general budget support. As a result of this 0.47 revenue inflow, social services 
expenditure is shown to have increased by 0.162 toea, infrastructure spending 
increased by 0.061 toea, and general government expenditure increased by 0.19 
toea. The results also show that budget support has had had a relatively benign, 
slightly positive, impact on domestic non-windfall revenue collection.  
In comparison, for a given one Kina increase in windfall revenues 0.36 toea has 
on average been received in the form of resource revenues. Of this 0.36 toea 
resource revenue inflow, just 0.009 toea has been allocated to social services, 
0.018 toea allocated to infrastructure, whilst 0.296 toea has  been allocated to 
general government expenditure. Further to this, resource revenue has also had 
a large negative impact on domestic non-windfall revenue collection. In short, 47 
per  cent  of  budget  support  revenues  were  allocated  to  social  services  and 
infrastructure activities, whilst the vast majority of resource revenues have been 
used to support general expenditures and a reduction in revenue collection from 
other domestic sources. As shall be discussed in the conclusion, one potential 
explanation  for  this  result  is  the  stronger  accountability  chains  between 
government and donors than those that exist between government and citizens.  19 
 
The final 17 toea of a given  one  Kina increase in windfall revenue has been 
received in the form of project aid, which unlike budget support is aid that has 
been allocated to a particular expenditure priority. Of this 17 toea, 4 toea has on 
average  been  allocated  to  social  services,  4  toea  has  been  allocated  to 
infrastructure and 9 toea has been allocated to other general expenditure items.   
Nearly all project aid funds allocated to social services have remained within the 
activities for which they were originally intended. Indeed for the 4 toea increase 
in project aid allocated to this sector, total expenditure has increased by 0.038 
toea.9 Further to this, the results also suggest that there has been a diversion of 
project aid away from the general expenditure category and towards social 
services  spending  –  with  13  toea  in  project  aid  allocated  to  the  general 
expenditure category increasing social services spending by 0.031 toea.   
For infrastructure, the 4 toea increase in project aid targeted to the sector leads 
to a 4.6 toea increase in infrastructure expenditure. This slightly larger increase 
in  expenditure  than  the  initial  revenue  inflow  is  known  generally  as  the 
‘flypaper’  effect  whereby  an  aid  inflow  leads  to  a  more  than  proportional 
increase  in  expenditure  in  that  sector  (Heller  1975;  Pack  &  Pack  1990; 
McGillivray & Ahmed 1999).10 A further result however is that the 1 3 toea of 
project aid allocated to other sectors of the economy have tended to encourage a 
diversion of funds, albeit small, away from the infrastructure sector  – likely as a 
result of counterpart funding or other conditionality’s being applied by donors in 
                                                 
9 It is also important to highlight that this result may be aggregating important ‘within sector’ 
expenditure reallocations. For example, government may alter education spending as a result of 
an inflow in health project aid, or vice-versa. Likewise, donor funding for one part of the health 
sector (i.e. maternal health) may impact on financing in another component of the sector (i.e. HIV 
funding). The degree to which this particular type of behaviour has taken place is not discernable 
from the results.  
10 One explanation for this effect is the ability of foreign aid to mobilise additional resources for 
government expenditures through, for example, improving tax collection or opening up new 
private sector sources of credit (World Bank 1998:64).  McGillivray and Morrissey (2000) also 
argue that with imperfect information flows and weak expenditure management systems, aid 
inflows may be  accompanied  with  misperceptions  or  ‘illusions’  regarding  either  the  real  or 
nominal value of the aid inflow, and the spending conditions attached (McGillivray and Morrissey 
2000:3).  For  example,  donors  may  deny  funds  due  to  the  recipient’s  failure  to  meet  certain 
conditionality agreements, following which the government may have to resort to additional 
borrowing to cover the expected revenue flow. Likewise, imperfect budgetary processes may 
overvalue the contribution of aid to a specific project or the aid inflow may require counterpart 
funding, both of which can also create a need for government to find additional funds. Equally, 
the government may also find that it has a lower need to borrow funds in the event that its public 
service under values the contribution of donor funds within a particular fiscal cycle.  20 
 
other sectors. This means that as a result of 17 toea in project aid, of which 4 
toea is allocated directly to the sector, infrastructure spending has increased by 
an average of 1.1 toea.  
The final and largest impact of project aid has been in the general expenditure 
category.  Of  the  9  toea  which  has  been  given  directly  to  this  category, 
expenditure has increased by an average of 16 toea. This result is a combination 
of the direct impact of project aid to the sector as well as the finding that aids 
being given to other sectors have been diverted towards general expenditure 
activities.  The  financing  for  these  additional  expenditure  in  the  general 
expenditure category are likely to have come both from the diversion of funds 
away from other expenditure items as well as the small positive impact which 
project aid is shown to have had on the collection of revenue, with 17 toea in 
project aid increasing domestic non-windfall revenue collection by 1 toea.  
7. Implication of Future Revenue Sources on Service Delivery 
Funding 
To date, the most rigorous assessment of the size of the revenue streams which 
may accrue to the  PNG Government as  a result  of the LNG project  has been 
carried out by ACIL Tasman (2009).11 This report provides 3 scenarios; a low 
revenue scenario  which is based on a long term oil price of $36 a barrel; a 
medium term scenario based on a long term oil price of $65 a barrel; and a high 
revenue scenario based on a long term oil price of $100 a barrel (ACIL Tasman 
2009:5). The time profile of these revenue streams are converted into per capita 
terms12  and shown in the Chart 2 below.  
PNG  is  also  expected  to  continue  receiving  substantial  aid  receipts  in  the 
foreseeable future. Given the unpredictable nature of donor support providing a 
long term estimate of how large those receipts is however more difficult. For the 
purposes of the following calculations  an assumption is made that by 2012 aid 
                                                 
11 These estimates have come under some criticisms by various stakeholders for utilising overly 
optimistic assumptions, particularly in regards to the negative impact which he LNG project may 
have on other sectors of the PNG economy – not least because the report was commissioned by 
Exxon Mobile during its negotiations with Government.  
12 Assuming a constant 2.3 per cent per annum population growth rate from 2010 onwards.  21 
 
flows have increased from their 2010 level by approximately 120 million Kina 
(20  Kina  per  capita)  and  then  for  the  rest  of  the  period  keep  pace  with  a 
population growth rate of 2.3 per cent per annum. Given Australia’s commitment 
to double the size of its aid programme by 2015, this increase may in fact be an 
understatement.   
Chart 2: Increase in Aid and Resource Revenues (2012 – 2020) 
 
Source: ACIL Tasman 2009; aid figures are authors own assumptions.  
What potential impact may these new revenue sources have on the composition 
of government spending?  
To assess this question this section applies the previously described expenditure 
elasticities to a hypothetical revenue scenario which incorporates an increase in 
resource revenues. These calculations also include an assumed increase in aid 
resources which maintain the same proportional sector allocation as their 5 year 
(2006-2010) average. The calculations are shown in Annex 2. 
It is important to highlight a number of assumptions underlying the calculations. 
These include: That there is no change in the prioritisation of donor funds, with 
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2006-2010; that all other revenue streams remain constant; that the calculated 
expenditure elasticity’s remain constant across the entire 18 year period; and 
that future expenditure allocations are reflected by the expenditure decisions of 
past government and that those priorities remain constant across the full period. 
In this sense, the calculations do not represent projections of future expenditure 
levels but rather are used to illustrate what expenditure patterns would emerge 
if  past  policy  choices  were  applied  to  future  revenue  scenarios.    With  these 
caveats  in  mind  the  results  reveal  a  number  of  important  insights  for  the 
potential impact of these future revenue streams.  
First, as can be seen in Chart 3 the revenue increase scenario has a large positive 
impact  on  infrastructure  expenditure,  rising  from  K20  per  capita  in  2010  to 
approximately K50 per capita by 2014. This increase brings total infrastructure 
spending to levels comparable with the very early post-independence period and 
just over double the average rate of investment in infrastructure recorded for the 
decade spanning 2000-2010.  
Second, the revenue increase scenario also has a positive impact on expenditure 
levels  in  the  social  services  sector,  but  this  effect  is  comparatively  small  in 
relation to the overall revenue increase. In this case total expenditure on social 
services increases from K45 per capita in 2010 to approximately K55 per capita 
by  2014.  This  increase  brings  total  spending  on  social  services  to  just  over 
double  those  recorded  during  the  early  2000’s  but  is  still  well  below  those 
recorded  in  the  early  post-independence  period  which  reached  averaged 
approximately K80 per capita.  
The final important result is that shown for non-windfall domestic revenue in 
Chart  4.  This  illustrates  the  potentially  large  negative  impact  which  the 
substantial growth in resource revenues can have on the collection of revenues 
from alternative domestic sources.  In  this case, the resource revenue inflow 
elicits a decline in the collection of non-windfall domestic revenue from K160 
per capita in 2010 to K120 per capita by 2014. So as total revenue and grants 
increase,  the  proportion  of  those  revenues  which  accrues  to  both  aid  and 23 
 
resources  is  raised  disproportionately–  further  increasing  the  Government’s 
dependency on windfall revenue sources. 
Chart 3: Impact of Revenue Composition on Future Government 
Expenditure 
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Chart 4: Impact on Revenue Composition 
 
Source: PNG Budget Documents (1975-2010). 
8. Conclusions  
This paper has analysed a variety of issues related to the impact of both aid and 
resource revenue on expenditure in post-independence PNG. It has also assessed 
the  relative  impact  of  budgetary  support  vis-à-vis  project-based  aid  on 
increasing expenditure in key service delivery sectors of the PNG economy and 
the extent to which funds allocated to these sectors have been diverted to other 
government  activities.  Estimated  elasticities  are  then  compared  against  a 
hypothetical  revenue  scenario  to  assess  the  potential  contribution  that  post-
2014 LNG revenue inflows may have on financing these service delivery sectors. 
In total, both aid and resource revenues have made a positive contribution to the 
overall funding levels of all expenditure categories in PNG since independence. 
This  result  does,  however,  mask  a  number  of  important  differences  between 
project aid and budgetary support across sectors.  
Whilst the majority of project aid has been spent in the sectors for which it was 
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than general budget support. Indeed, for social services (which include health 
and  education  expenditure)  an  additional  Kina  in  budget  support  has  had  a 
larger impact on expenditure than an additional Kina of project aid. This result 
supports the findings of Batten (2010) which utilised a dynamic framework to 
analyse  the  impact  of  aid  on  expenditure  and  debt  behaviour  of  the  PNG 
Government. It also supports AusAID (2003, p. 27) which argued that ‘funding 
for key sectors such as infrastructure, health and education was higher when 
PNG was receiving budget support than in more recent times’. The implication 
here  is  that  government  priorities  matter  most  for  how  aid  impacts  on 
expenditure allocations, not donor aid modalities. 
Both project aid and budget support has also had a small positive impact on the 
collection of domestic non-windfall revenue. For budget support in particular, 
this result is consistent with PNG’s fiscal history as the large declines in budget 
support  undertaken  in  the  early  post-independence  period  required  the 
Government to increasingly rely on domestic revenue sources. 
Resource revenues on the other hand have had a significant negative impact on 
the mobilisation of domestic non-windfall revenues, indicating that commodity 
boom periods are likely to be accompanied by a weakening of efforts to collect 
taxation  from  other  sectors  of  the  economy.  This  result  has  particular 
significance in lieu of the upcoming inflow of resources from the LNG project. 
Avoiding a disproportionately large increase in resource revenue dependency 
will be a major challenge for PNG authorities.   
The  future  revenue  scenario  calculations  illustrate  that  if  past  expenditure 
responses to resource revenue inflows are replicated with the upcoming LNG 
revenue boom, then per capita funding for the social services sector is unlikely to 
surpass previous peak levels that were being recorded during the 70s and 80s. In 
contrast, infrastructure has been a large recipient of resource revenue inflows 
and a similar response to LNG revenue inflows would almost double long run 
average rates of investment in that sector.  
The results also show that with a rapidly growing population and the projected 
high growth  in resource  revenues,  aid  flows  will  comprise  an  ever  declining 26 
 
proportional share in PNG’s total resource envelope. Donors have an important 
role to play in providing targeted interventions that improve the efficiency of 
public  expenditure  and  alleviate  constraints  to  growth,  but  their  ability  to 
influence aggregate recurrent expenditures in social services will decline. 
Finally, it is important to highlight that past behaviour is not necessarily a guide 
to  future  expenditure  patterns.  Government’s  change  and  so  do  their  policy 
decisions and expenditure priorities. Growing real per capita expenditure for 
health, education and infrastructure in the post-2002 commodity boom period is 
a positive indication that more priority is being place on these activities than in 
the past.  
Maximising the impact of resource revenues on service delivery must also be 
balanced against the broader challenge of managing the many well-known risks 
that  a  resource  project  of  this  scale  entails.  Exchange  appreciation  and 
realignment of domestic production away from other tradable good sectors is 
the primary example. PNG will also have to remain vigilant against the negative 
patterns of political and institutional behaviour that  are encouraged by large 
inflows of funds from resource extraction. 
The Government has made good progress in managing these risks by creating a 
new sovereign wealth fund which will sterilise export earnings and promote a 
high level  of  accountability over  fund usage.  The  sovereign  wealth  fund  also 
places a large focus on  smoothing expenditure over time. This is particularly 
important for service delivery items  such as  health and education  which  are 
predominately recurrent in nature. Achieving a long term increase in funding to 
these sectors will thus be more dependent on the ability of the Fund to provide 
consistent and predictable revenues which allow budgetary planners to expand 
recurrent expenditure items without fear of eroding fiscal sustainability.  
However, as PNG’s history illustrates without sufficient political commitment to 
long term expenditure management institutional structures such as this can be 
easily  abused.  The  most  important  factor  therefore  in  transforming  resource 
revenues  into  improved  long  term  development  outcomes  will  be  the 
strengthening  of  domestic  accountability  mechanisms  across  all  levels  of 27 
 
government.  At  its  core,  these  efforts  should  focus  on  strengthening  of  the 
domestic budget process, its oversight and the integration of the Government’s 





















9. Annex 1: Full description of estimation results 
Impact of Windfall Revenues on Social Services Spending  
For every 1 Kina of windfall revenues allocated at historical averages: 
0.04 Kina has been given through project aid to Social Services. This has 
led to a 0.038 Kina increase in Social Services expenditure. Project aid to 
this sector has largely stayed where it was intended to go.  
0.13 Kina has been given through project aid to sectors other than social 
services.  This has led to a further 0.031 Kina increase in Social Services 
expenditure. This indicates project aid delivered to other sectors has freed 
up  a  small  portion  of  domestic  resources  to  be  transferred  to  Social 
Services.  
In total, 0.17 Kina of project aid allocated at historical averages (0.04 
Kina  to  Social  Services  and  0.13  to  other  sectors)  has  led  to  an 
average 0.069 Kina increase in Social Services Expenditure.  
0.47 Kina has been given in the form of General Budgetary Support. This 
has led to a 0.162 Kina increase in Social Services expenditure, indicating 
that approximately 34 per cent of Budget Support was allocated to Social 
Services expenditure.  
In total, for an additional Kina in windfall revenues, the 64 per cent 
which  has  been  received  in  the  form  of  donor  grants  have,  on 
average, led to a 0.231 Kina increase in Social Services expenditure.  
0.36  Kina  has  been  received  in  the  form  of  resource  revenues.  These 
revenues  have  led  to  a  0.009  increase  in  Social  Services  expenditure, 
suggesting that on average 2.5 per cent of resource revenues have been 
allocated to Social Services (much lower than the proportion of Budget 
Support  which was allocated to this sector).  
In total, the combination of these results suggests, that following a 1 
Kina increase in windfall revenues, received  between project  aid, 
budget support and resource revenues at their historical averages, 
Social Services expenditure will increase by 0.240 Kina.  
Impact of Windfall Revenues on Infrastructure Spending  
For every 1 Kina of windfall revenues allocated at historical averages: 
0.04 Kina has been given through project aid to Infrastructure. This has led 
to a 0.046 Kina increase in Infrastructure expenditure. Project aid to this 
sector has thus largely stayed where it was intended to go and encouraged 
a slightly higher level of spending in the sector by Government.  29 
 
0.13  Kina  has  been  given  through  project  aid  to  sectors  other  than 
Infrastructure.    This  has  led  to  a  0.035  Kina  decline  in  Infrastructure 
expenditure.  This  indicates  project  aid  delivered  to  other  sectors  has 
encouraged the Government to transfer its own resources away from the 
Infrastructure sector.  
In total, the combination of these effects means that for 0.04 Kina in 
Infrastructure  project  aid  and  0.13  Kina  project  aid  allocated  to 
other  sectors,  total  expenditure  in  the  Infrastructure  sectors 
increases by 0.011 Kina, or approximately 25 per cent of the original 
project aid inflow.  
0.47 Kina has been given in the form of General Budgetary Support. This 
has led to a 0.061 Kina increase in Infrastructure expenditure, indicating 
that  approximately  13  per  cent  of  Budget  Support  was  allocated  to 
Infrastructure expenditure.  
In total, for an additional Kina in windfall revenues, the 64 per cent 
which  has  been  received  in  the  form  of  donor  grants  have,  on 
average, led to a 0.072 Kina increase in Infrastructure expenditure.  
0.36  Kina  has  been  received  in  the  form  of  resource  revenues.  These 
revenues  have  led  to  a  0.018  increase  in  Infrastructure  expenditure, 
suggesting  that  on  average  5  per  cent of  resource  revenues  have  been 
allocated to Infrastructure (which is higher than the proportion of Budget 
Support which was allocated to this sector).  
In total, the combination of these results suggests, that following a 1 
Kina increase in windfall revenues, received  between project  aid, 
budget support and resource revenues at their historical averages, 
Infrastructure expenditure will increase by 0.090 Kina.  
Impact of Windfall Revenues on General Spending  
For every 1 Kina of windfall revenues allocated at historical averages: 
0.09 Kina has been given through project aid to the General category. This 
has led to a 0.163 Kina increase in General expenditure. Project aid to this 
sector has thus had a large impact on mobilising additional Government 
resources in these expenditure categories.  
0.08 Kina has been given through project aid to sectors other than general. 
This has led to a 0.004 Kina increase in General expenditure. This indicates 
project aid delivered to the General category has freed up a small amount 
of resources to be transferred to the General expenditure category. This 
implies that aid funds delivered to the Infrastructure and Social Services 
sectors has not freed up large quantities of funds to be transferred to other 
expenditure categories represented by the General category.  
In total, the combination of these effects means that for 0.08 Kina in 
General  project  aid  and  0.09  Kina  project  aid  allocated  to  other 30 
 
sectors, total expenditure in the General sector increases by 0.167 
Kina. 
0.47 Kina has been given in the form of General Budgetary Support. This 
has led to a 0.197 Kina increase in General expenditure, indicating that 
approximately 42 per cent of Budget  Support  was  allocated to General 
expenditure.  
In total, for an additional Kina in windfall revenues, the 64 per cent 
which  has  been  received  in  the  form  of  donor  grants  have,  on 
average, led to a 0.364 Kina increase in General expenditure.  
0.36  Kina  has  been  received  in  the  form  of  resource  revenues.  These 
revenues  have  led  to  a  0.296  increase  in  Infrastructure  expenditure, 
suggesting that on average 82 per cent of resource revenues have been 
allocated to General expenditure (which is higher than the proportion of 
Budget Support which was allocated to this sector).  
In total, the combination of these results suggests, that following a 1 
Kina increase in windfall revenues, received  between project  aid, 
budget support and resource revenues at their historical averages, 
General expenditure will increase by 0.660 Kina.  
Impact of Windfall Revenues on Non-Windfall Domestic Revenue Collection  
For every 1 Kina of windfall revenues allocated at historical averages  
0.17 Kina has been received in the form of project aid, 0.47 Kina has been 
received in the form of general budget support and 0.36 Kina has been 
received  in  the  form  of  resource  revenues.  Both  budget  support  and 
project aid have had a positive impact on the collection of non-windfall 
revenue receipts.  For budget support in particular, this result is consistent 
with  PNG’s  fiscal  history  as  the  large  declines  in  budget  support 
undertaken  in  the  early  post-independence  period  required  the 
Government to increasingly rely on domestic revenue sources.  
Resource revenues on the other hand have had an overall negative impact 
on the collection of non-windfall domestic revenue. An additional inflow of 
0.36 Kina in resource revenues leads to a 0.163 Kina decline in revenue 









































IMPACT OF RESOURCE REVENUE INCREASE   
Infrastructure  20.36  0.08  0.00  22.62  33.16  32.96  32.74  30.98  31.29  28.61  28.93 
Social Services  47.00  0.01  0.00  4.22  6.19  6.15  6.11  5.78  5.84  5.34  5.40 
General  176.14  0.15  0.00  45.23  66.33  65.92  65.49  61.95  62.58  57.22  57.87 
                         
Domestic NW Revenue   158.60  -0.10  0.00  -30.46  -44.66  -44.38  -44.10  -41.71  -42.14  -38.53  -38.96 
                         
IMPACT OF AID INCREASE (5 YEAR AV.) 
Infrastructure  20.36  0.01  0.22  0.22  0.22  0.22  0.22  0.22  0.22  0.22  0.22 
Social Services  47.00  0.13  2.60  2.60  2.60  2.60  2.60  2.60  2.60  2.60  2.60 
General  176.14  0.37  7.40  7.40  7.40  7.40  7.40  7.40  7.40  7.40  7.40 
                         
Domestic NW Revenue   158.60  0.16  3.10  3.10  3.10  3.10  3.10  3.10  3.10  3.10  3.10 
                         
NET IMPACT OF RESOURCE AND AID REVENUE INCREASE  
                         
Infrastructure      0.22  22.84  33.38  33.18  32.96  31.20  31.51  28.83  29.15 
Social Services      2.60  6.82  8.79  8.75  8.71  8.38  8.44  7.94  8.00 
General      7.40  52.63  73.73  73.32  72.89  69.35  69.98  64.62  65.27 
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